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Introduction  
The decision in Wall v Collins 1 makes interesting and constructive reading for any student 
bored with the topic of easements in land law. As a legal case it has much to commend it, 
including bad neighbours, a litigant in person and an area of land in dispute of no great size 
but a costs award of many tens of thousands of pounds.2 A case, in fact, whose context will 
come as no great surprise to any so-called “High Street” solicitor or trainee. 
However, both the student and the solicitor will need to study the case with some care. As 
such therefore it is offered as a possible aid to teaching that part of land law dealing with 
easements. Unfortunately, in general land law is a subject that students would not opt to 
study if it were an elective subject rather than a necessary prerequisite for a Qualifying Law 
Degree. Consequently, this piece attempts to set out a sketch (from the author's own reading 
of the case) that it is hoped will assist with student understanding of the case. It is only 
intended to provide the reader with their “bearings” (and to help visual learners), and a 
deliberately truncated version of the various dealings with titles to the properties involved in 
the case. A very brief “revision note” on that part of easements dealing with capability and 
duration has also been included. 
As a possible teaching aid Wall v Collins might be offered to students to demonstrate how 
easements arise, how they might become extinguished, the necessary requirements for them 
to exist at all, and their practical importance for certain types of housing. This last point is 
offered as a possible “bridge” to the Legal Practice Course module Property Law and Practice 
(again a compulsory module for anyone wishing to qualify as a solicitor). 
 
*Cov. L.J. 13  The case of Wall v Collins  
Wall v Collins (hereinafter Wall ) raises the issue of whether an easement can be said to 
expire when granted as part of a long lease that is itself subsequently merged into the 
freehold. In other words, can the easement be said to continue, or does it too come to an end 
upon extinguishment of the lease? The conventional view is that once the lease no longer 
subsists then all rights and obligations under it must likewise come to an end. 
A little simple revision on easements might assist, and thus before examining the case it is as 
well to re-visit some basic issues: 
• An easement is a right (such as a right of way on foot) over the (private) land of another 
that benefits the land of the holder of that right. Thus we get dominant and servient land (or 
tenement), where the dominant land has the benefit of the right of way. 
• An easement can be granted expressly by deed or by implication. Where granted expressly, 
as in Wall, then its status is of a legal interest in the land,3 and so its juridical nature will be 
proprietary. Case law has provided a number of requirements dealing with what makes such 
an interest capable of being an easement.4  
• If the right claimed is so capable, then in determining whether it is legal or equitable in 
nature, it must, inter alia, be of an equivalent duration to one of the legal estates in land.5 
Famously this is either the freehold or the leasehold estate in land. It is therefore possible for 
an easement to be freehold in nature even where the estate out of which it is carved, so to 
speak, is itself a leasehold. When looking at Wall, it will be useful to bear these simple 
revision points in mind. 
The facts in Wall  
The appellant, Mr Wall (W), was the registered proprietor of No. 231 Leigh Road and Mr 
Collins and his wife (C) were the registered proprietors of No. 233 Leigh Road, directly to the 
south of No. 231. Their houses were semi-detached. At the rear and running parallel with 
Leigh Road is Back Street over which both W and C had access. Both Leigh Road and Back 
Street are public highways and therefore maintainable at the public expense. 
W claimed a right of way (an easement) over a passageway (known as South Road) that runs 
along the south side of No. 233 and formed part of that property's title and connected Back 
Street to Leigh Road; in other words, providing a very convenient link that will be obvious to 
all who are familiar with this type of semi-detached *Cov. L.J. 14  housing. The sketch on 
the next page (which is not to scale) might assist. In addition, below is a truncated version of 
devolution of the titles: 
1) The land on which both houses were built was subject to a 999 year lease that had 
commenced in 1910. 
2) The houses were subsequently erected on that land by 1911 and the tenant of No. 231 
was granted an easement by his lease that permitted “…a right on foot…and [with] vehicles 
over, inter alia, South Road and thence to Back Street…” 
3) Subsequently the titles fell to be compulsorily registered at H. M. Land Registry. 
4) By 2004 the Land Registry had closed the leasehold title to No. 233, leaving just the 
freehold register in existence. 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE 
W= Wall; C= Collins' respective properties. 
NB South Road is delineated by dotted lines and links Leigh Road to Back Street, and is part 
of the title to No 233. 
The question for the court was whether the right of way (easement) granted by the lease in 
1910 in favour of the leaseee at No. 231 over South Road (and being part of No. 233) 
become extinguished when the leasehold estate was merged with the freehold estate, thus 
entitling the owners of No. 233 to interfere with or terminate the exercise of the easement by 
erecting some gates? Additionally, did s.62 (2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 apply so that 
the easement granted by the lease becomes subsequently “attached” to the freehold estate? 
Section 62(2) provides as follows: 
*Cov. L.J. 15  “…all…rights and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to 
appertain to the lands, houses or other buildings conveyed.” Every “conveyance” of land is 
therefore deemed by this subsection to include easements. 
 
The first instance decision  
At first instance the Judge, H.H Judge Pelling Q C, held that upon merger of the freehold and 
leasehold estates of No. 233 the easement granted under the 1910 lease in favour of No. 231 
had also become extinguished, since the easement was attached to the leasehold estate and 
to no other interest in the land. Neither did s.62(2) LPA attach the easement to the freehold. 
 
The decision in the Court of Appeal  
The Court of Appeal reversed the first instance judge. This was somewhat surprising because 
the judge had only stated the position as most land lawyers would have understood it. The 
judge had in fact relied on academic opinion for this view,6 but the Court of Appeal felt that 
he had misinterpreted it, Carnwath LJ stating: 
“An easement must be appurtenant to a dominant tenement, but not necessarily to any 
particular interest for the time being…the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that a legal 
easement may be created for the equivalent of a freehold interest, or of an interest 
“equivalent to …a term of years” (s1(2)(a)). In the latter case, there is nothing to suggest 
that an easement for a term of years has to be attached to a leasehold interest of equivalent 
duration. All that matters is that the grantee has an interest at least co-extensive with the 
period of the easement.”7  
He then went on to justify this view on grounds of “common sense”: 
“…, as a matter of common sense, it is difficult to see why a lessee should be worse off, so 
far as concerns an easement annexed to the land, merely because he has acquired a larger 
interest in the dominant tenement.”8  
Carnwath LJ then went on to deal with the s 62(2) point, notwithstanding this was rendered 
unnecessary by virtue of the judgment on the merger aspect (above). Again the Court of 
Appeal disagreed with the first instance judge, finding support in International Tea Stores v 
Hobbs: 9  
“The real truth is that you do not consider the question of title to use, but the question of fact 
of user; you have to inquire whether the way was in fact used, not under what title it has 
been used, although you must of course take into consideration all the circumstances of the 
case…” 
 
*Cov. L.J. 16  Commentary  
Lord Justice Carnwath's judgment) with which both Hooper and Mummery LJJ agreed, relied 
on International Tea Stores v Hobbs (above) and Kent v Kavanagh, 10 but even so, this is a 
very unusual decision that overturns previously accepted wisdom. Part of the reasoning 
(obiter ) seems to have been that without this approach many semi-detached property 
owners would find themselves in possibly unworkable situations. Thus, pragmatism seems to 
be part of their Lordship's rationale. However, even this is not without impact, notably at 
H.M. Land Registry which found itself having to issue a new Practice Guide (Addendum to 
practice Guide 26 ) confirming that easements granted by a lease were not lost on merger 
with the freehold, and would subsist for the benefit of the dominant landowner for the period 
for which they were originally granted; in other words the remaining term of the lease, even 
though the lease itself had come to an end. 
Many practitioners and academics had thought that upon merger easements are lost. That 
position seems to have become the so-called conventional view, and even though there is 
little or no authority to support it, it at least has some logic to it, and it is certainly the view 
of Sara,11 and likewise H.M. Land Registry. That is especially so given that it was also 
thought that an easement must attach to an estate in land, because that is what s.1 (2) Law 
of Property Act 1925 would appear to be saying. Following Wall, it seems we were all wrong 
and that the easement need only attach to a dominant tenement, rather than the actual 
estate in the land. As Dixon asserts “…there was a respectable argument that this was so.”12  
Criticism of Wall has not just been left to the legal academy either. The Law Commission 
has asked for a statutory appeal of this decision:13  
“We consider that the position is in acute need of clarification. Our current view is that as a 
matter of principle an easement is attached to an estate in the land (either freehold or 
leasehold), and that it follows as a matter of logic that termination of that estate must 
extinguish the easement.”14  
However, before we all rush to agree with that sentiment, it must be remembered that there 
is some force behind the pragmatic obiter part of the Wall judgment. Our vast swathes of 
terraced and semi-detached houses rely heavily on easements over countless paths and 
driveways. Without such facilities those types of properties will become much less viable. The 
question is, is that a sound basis upon which to rest an appeal decision? Perhaps the final 
comment should belong to Dixon15  
*Cov. L.J. 17  “This novel doctrine [Wall v Collins ] was important to the result in that 
case…, but it is not at all clear that it is correct outside of the special facts of that case.” 
Senior Lecturer in Law, Coventry University 
Cov. L.J. 2010, 15(1), 12-17 
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